



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

6 October 1949.

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MEMORANDUM For: Director of Central Intelligence.

Subject: IM-232 - Significance of Recent Intensified Soviet Action against Tito.

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence dissents from IM-232 in the following respects:

(a) Paragraph 2 - ONI disagrees with the statement that an increase of Soviet ground forces from 5 to 7 divisions is "a more significant development". In addition, the impression is given that direct Soviet military aggression will be probable if and when the Soviet ground forces on the Yugoslav periphery number 15 or more divisions. ONI believes that the presence of 15 or more Soviet divisions on the Yugoslav periphery, while worthy of serious scrutiny, would not in itself indicate a Soviet intention to invade Yugoslavia.

(b) Paragraph 3, line 1 - The abrogation of friendship treaties between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and Satellites is described as a "third step" in the intensification of Soviet pressure against Tito. The meaning of "third" in this respect is unclear.

(c) Paragraph 3, line 3 - ... "it is estimated that the Kremlin will exhaust all other means before turning to overt military action." ONI does not believe that the inevitability of overt Soviet military action against Tito can be estimated at this time.

(d) Paragraph 4, line 2 - ONI believes that there is an urgent Soviet need for the elimination of Tito and his group. There is no justification to imply that Tito is still within the Stalinist camp.

FELIX JOHNSON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

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